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Abstract
We give a conceptual analysis of (defeasible or nonmonotonic) inheritance dia-
grams, and compare our analysis to the ”small/big sets” of preferential and related
reasoning.
In our analysis, we consider nodes as information sources and truth values, direct
links as information, and valid paths as information channels and comparisons of
truth values. This results in an upward chaining, split validity, off-path preclusion
inheritance formalism.
We show that the small/big sets of preferential reasoning have to be relativized
if we want them to conform to inheritance theory, resulting in a more cautious
approach, perhaps closer to actual human reasoning.
Finally, we interpret inheritance diagrams as theories of prototypical reasoning,
based on two distances: set difference, and information difference.
We will also see that some of the major distinctions between inheritance for-
malisms are consequences of deeper and more general problems of treating conflict-
ing information.
AMS Classification: 68T27, 68T30
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1 Introduction
Throughout this paper, ”inheritance” will stand for ”nonmonotonic or defeasible inher-
itance”. We will use indiscriminately ”inheritance system”, ”inheritance diagram”, ”in-
heritance network”, ”inheritance net”.
In this introduction, we first give the motivation for this article, then describe in very
brief terms the basic components of inheritance diagrams, mention the basic ideas of our
analysis, as well as some more general decisions about treating contradictory information.
Motivation
Inheritance sytems or diagrams have an intuitive appeal. They seem close to human rea-
soning, natural, and are also implemented (see [Mor98]). Yet, they are a more procedural
approach to nonmonotonic reasoning, and, to the author’s knowledge, a conceptual analy-
sis, leading to a formal semantics, as well as a comparison to more logic based formalisms
like the systems P and R of preferential systems are lacking. We attempt to reduce the
gap between the more procedural and the more analytical approaches in this particular
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case. This will also give indications how to modify systems P and R to approach them
more to actual human reasoning. Moreover, we establish a link to multi-valued logics and
the logics of information sources (see e.g. [ABK07] and forthcoming work of the same
authors, and also [BGH95]).
Inheritance diagrams:
Inheritance diagrams are deceptively simple. Their conceptually complicated nature is
seen by e.g. the fundamental difference between direct links and valid paths, and the
multitude of existing formalisms, upward vs. downward chaining, intersection of exten-
sions vs. direct scepticism, on-path vs. off-path preclusion (or pre-emption), split validity
vs. total validity preclusion etc., to name a few. Such a proliferation of formalisms usually
hints at deeper problems on the conceptual side, i.e. that the underlying ideas are am-
bigous, and not sufficiently analysed. Therefore, any clarification and resulting reduction
of possible formalisms seems a priori to make progress. Such clarification will involve
conceptual decisions, which need not be shared by all, they can only be suggestions. Of
course, a proof that such decisions are correct is impossible, and so is its contrary.
Our analysis:
We will introduce into the analysis of inheritance systems a number of concepts not
usually found in the field, like multiple truth values, access to information, comparison of
truth values, etc. We think that this additional conceptual burden pays off by a better
comprehension and analysis of the problems behind the surface of inheritance.
We will also see that some distinctions between inheritance formalisms go far beyond ques-
tions of inheritance, and concern general problems of treating contradictory information
- isolating some of these is another objective of this article.
The text is essentially self-contained, still some familiarity with the basic concepts of
inheritance systems and nonmonotonic logics in general is helpful. For a presentation, the
reader might look into [Sch97-2] and [Sch04].
A.Bochman, has pointed out to author work by J.Barwise, D.Gabbay, C.Hartonas,
[BGH95], on information flow. This has a superficial resemblance with the present pages.
But, first, the BGH work is much deeper into logic, presenting sequent calculi, complete-
ness results, etc. Second, our work is on non-monotonic logics, which BGH is not, and our
main thrust is a conceptual analysis of inheritance networks, also working with multiple
truth values. But the basic ideas are about similar situations.
The text is organized as follows. After an introduction to inheritance theory and big/small
subsets and the systems P and R in Section 2 and Section 3, we turn to an informal
description of the fundamental differences between inheritance and the systems P and
R in Section 4.2, give an analysis of inheritance systems in terms of information and
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information flow in Section 4.3, then in terms of reasoning with prototypes in Section
4.4, and conclude in Section 5 with a translation of inheritance into (necessarily deeply
modified) coherent systems of big/small sets, respectively logical systems P and R.
One of the main modifications will be to relativize the notions of small/big, which thus
become less ”mathematically pure” but perhaps closer to actual use in ”dirty” common
sense reasoning.
2 Introduction to nonmonotonic inheritance
2.1 Basic discussion
We give here an informal discussion. The reader unfamiliar with inheritance systems
should consult in parallel Definition 2.3 and Definition 2.4. As there are many variants of
the definitions, it seems reasonable to discuss them before a formal introduction, which,
otherwise, would pretend to be definite without being so.
(Defeasible or nonmonotonic) inheritance networks or diagrams
Nonmonotonic inheritance systems describe situations like ”normally, birds fly”, written
birds→ fly. Exceptions are permitted, ”normally penguins don′t fly”, penguins 6→ fly.
Definition 2.1
(+++*** Orig. No.: Definition 2.1 )
A nonmonotonic inheritance net is a finite DAG, directed, acyclic graph, with two types
of arrows or links, → and 6→, and labelled nodes. We will use Γ etc. for such graphs, and
σ etc. for paths - the latter to be defined below.
Roughly (and to be made precise and modified below, we try to give here just a first
intuition), X → Y means that ”normal” elements of X are in Y, and X 6→ Y means that
”normal” elements of X are not in Y. In a semi-quantitative set interpretation, we will
read ”most elements of X are in Y ′′, ”most elements of X are not in Y ′′, etc. This is by
no means the only interpretation, as we will see.
According to the set intrepretation, we will also use informally expressions like X ∩ Y,
X-Y, CX, etc. But we will also use nodes informally as formulas, like X ∧ Y, X ∧ ¬Y,
¬X, etc. All this will only be used as an appeal to intuition.
Nodes at the beginning of an arrow can also stand for individuals, so Tweety 6→ fly
means something like: ”normally, Tweety will not fly”. As always in nonmonotonic
systems, exceptions are permitted, so the soft rules ”birds fly”, ”penguins don′t fly”,
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and (the hard rule) ”penguins are birds” can coexist in one diagram, penguins are then
abnormal birds (with respect to flying). The direct link penguins 6→ fly will thus be
accepted, or considered valid, but not the composite path penguins → birds → fly, by
specificity - see below. This is illustrated by Diagram 2.1, where a stands for Tweety, c
for penguins, b for birds, d for flying animals or objects.
(Remark: The arrows a → c, a → b, and c → b can also be composite paths - see below
for the details.)
Diagram 2.1
The Tweety diagram
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ✒
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅■
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ✒
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅■
 
✛
a
b b
d
(Of course, there is an analogous case for the opposite polarity, i.e. when the arrow from
b to d is negative, and the one from c to d is positive.)
The main problem is to define in an intuitively acceptable way a notion of valid path, i.e.
concatenations of arrows satisfying certain properties.
We will write Γ |= σ, if σ is a valid path in the network Γ, and if x is the origin, and
y the endpoint of σ, and σ is positive, we will write Γ |= xy, i.e. we will accept the
conclusion that x’s are y′s, and analogously Γ |= xy for negative paths. Note that we
will not accept any other conclusions, only those established by a valid path, so many
questions about conclusions have a trivial negative answer: there is obviously no path
from x to y. E.g., there is no path from b to c in Diagram 2.1. Likewise, there are no
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disjunctions, conjunctions etc. in our conclusions, and negation is present only in a strong
form: ”it is not the case that x’s are normally y′s” is not a possible conclusion, only ”x’s
are normally not y′s” is one. Also, possible contradictions are contained, there is no EFQ.
To simplify matters, we assume that for no two nodes x, y ∈ Γ x→ y and x 6→ y are both
in Γ, intuitively, that Γ is free from (hard) contradictions. This restriction is inessential
for our purposes. We admit, however, soft contradictions, and preclusion, which allows
us to solve some soft contradictions - as we already did in the penguins example. We will
also assume that all arrows stand for rules with possibly exceptions, again, this restriction
is not important for our purposes. Moreover, in the abstract treatment, we will assume
that all nodes stand for sets, though this will not be true for all examples discussed.
This might be the place for a remark on absence of cycles. Suppose we also have a positive
arrow from b to c in Diagram 2.1. Then, the concept of preclusion collapses, as there are
now equivalent arguments to accept a→ b→ d and a→ c 6→ d. Thus, if we do not want
to introduce new complications, we cannot rely on preclusion to decide conflicts. It seems
that this will change the whole outlook on such diagrams.
Inheritance networks were introduced about 20 years ago (see e.g. [Tou84], [Tou86],
[THT87]), and exist in a multitude of more or less differing formalisms, see e.g. [Sch97-2]
for a brief discussion. There still does not seem to exist a satisfying semantics for these
networks. The author’s own attempt [Sch90] is an a posteriori semantics, which cannot
explain or criticise or decide between the different formalisms. We will give here a con-
ceptual analysis, which provides also at least some building blocks for a semantics, and a
translation into (a modified version of) the language of small/big subsets, familiar from
preferential structures, see below in Section 3.
We will now discuss the two fundamental situations of contradictions, then give a detailed
inductive definition of valid paths for a certain formalism so the reader has firm ground
under his feet, and then present briefly some alternative formalisms.
As in all of nonmonotonic reasoning, the interesting questions arise in the treatment of
contradictions and exceptions. The difference in quality of information is expressed by
”preclusion” (or ′′pre−emption′′). The basic diagram is the Tweety diagram, see Diagram
2.1.
Unresolved contradictions give either rise to a branching into different extensions, which
may roughly be seen as maximal consistent subsets, or to mutual cancellation in directly
sceptical approaches. The basic diagram for the latter is the Nixon Diamond, see Diagram
2.2, where a = Nixon, b = Quaker, c = Republican, d = pacifist.
In the directly sceptical approach, we will not accept any path from a to d as valid, as
there is an unresolvable contradiction between the two candidates.
The extensions approach can be turned into an indirectly sceptical one, by forming first
all extensions, and then taking the intersection of either the sets of valid paths, or of valid
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Diagram 2.2
The Nixon Diamond
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ✒
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅■
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ✒
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅■
 
a
b c
d
conclusions, see [MS91] for a detailed discussion.
In more detail:
Preclusion
In the above example, our intuition tells us that it is not admissible to conclude from
the fact that penguins are birds, and that most birds fly that most penguins fly. The
horizontal arrow c→ b together with c 6→ d barrs this conclusion, it expresses specificity.
Consequently, we have to define the conditions under which two potential paths neutralize
each other, and when one is victorious. The idea is as follows: 1) We want to be sceptical,
in the sense that we do not believe every potential path. We will not arbitrarily chose
one either. 2) Our scepticism will be restricted, in the sense that we will often make well
defined choices for one path in the case of conflict: a) If a compound potential path is
in conflict with a direct link, the direct link wins. b) Two conflicting paths of the same
type neutralize each other, as in the Nixon Diamond, where neither potential path will
be valid. c) More specific information will win over less specific one.
(It is essential in the Tweety diagram that the arrow c 6→ d is a direct link, so it is in
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a way stronger than compound paths.) The arrows a → b, a → c, c → b can also be
composite paths: The path from c to b (read c ⊆ . . .⊆ b!), however, tells us, that the
information coming from c is more specific (and thus considered more reliable), so the
negative path from a to d via c will win over the positive one via b. The precise inductive
definition will be given below. This concept is evidently independent of the lenght of the
paths, a · · · → c may be much longer than a · · · → b, so this is not shortest path reasoning
(which has some nasty drawbacks, discussed e.g. in [HTT87]).
Before we give a formalism based on these ideas, we refine them, adopt one possibility
(but indicate some modifications), and discuss alternatives later.
2.2 Directly sceptical split validity upward chaining off-path
inheritance
Our approach will be directly sceptical, i.e. unsolvable contradictions result in the absence
of valid paths, it is upward chaining, and split-validity for preclusions (discussed below).
We will indicate modifications to make it extension based, as well as for total-validity
preclusion. This approach is strongly inspired by classical work in the field by Horty,
Thomason, Touretzky, and others, and we claim no priority whatever. If it is new at all,
it is a very minor modification of existing formalisms.
Our conceptual ideas to be presented in detail in Section 4.3 make split validity, off-path
preclusion and upward chaining a natural choice.
For the reader’s convenience, we give here a very short resume of these ideas: We consider
only arrows as information, e.g. a→ b will be considered information b valid at or for a.
Valid (composed positive) paths will not be considered (direct) information. They will
be seen as a way to obtain information, so a valid path σ : x . . . → a makes information
b accessible to x, and, secondly, as a means of comparing information strength, so a valid
path σ : a . . . . → a′ will make information at a stronger than information at a′. Valid
negative paths have no function, we will only consider the positive initial part as discussed
above, and the negative end arrow as information, but never the whole path.
Choosing direct scepticism is a decision beyond the scope of this article, and we just make
it. It is a general question how to treat contradictory and absent information, and if they
are equivalent or not, see the remark in Section 4.4. (The fundamental difference between
intersection of extensions and direct scepticism for defeasible inheritance was shown in
[Sch93].)
We turn now to the announced variants as well as a finer distinction within the directly
sceptical approach.
Our approach generates another problem, essentially that of the treatment of a mixture of
contradictory and concordant information of multiple strengths or truth values. We bun-
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dle the decision of this problem with that for direct scepticism into a ”plug-in” decision,
which will be used in three approaches: the conceptual ideas, the inheritance algorithm,
and the choice of the reference class for subset size (and implicitly also for the treatment
as a prototype theory). It is thus well encapsulated, and independent from the context.
These decisions (but, perhaps to a lesser degree, (1)) concern a wider subject than only
inheritance networks. Thus, it is not surprising that there are different formalisms for
solving such networks, deciding one way or the other. But this multitude is not the fault
of inheritance theory, it is only a symptom of a deeper question. We first give an overview
for a clearer overall picture, and discuss them in detail below, as they involve sometimes
quite subtle questions.
(1) Upward chaining against downward or double chaining.
(2.1) Off-path against on-path preclusion.
(2.2) Split validity preclusion against total validity preclusion.
(3) Direct scepticism against intersection of extensions.
(4) Treatment of mixed contradiction and preclusion situations, no preclusion by paths
of the same polarity.
(1) This can also be seen as a difference in reasoning from cause to effect vs. backward
reasoning, looking for causes for an effect. (A word of warning: There is a well-known
article [SL89] from which a superficial reader might conclude that upward chaining is
tractable, and downward chaining is not. A more careful reading reveals that, on the
negative side, the authors only show that double chaining is not tractable.) We will
adopt upward chaining in all our approaches. See Section 4.4 for more remarks.
(2.1) and (2.2) Both are consequences of our view - to be discussed below in Section 4.3 - to
see valid paths also as an absolute comparison of truth values, independent of reachability
of information. This question of absoluteness transcends obviously inheritance networks.
Our decision is, of course, again uniform for all our approaches.
(3) This point, too, is much more general than the problems of inheritance. It is, among
other things, a question of whether only the two possible cases (positive and negative)
may hold, or whether there might be still other possibilities. See Section 4.4.
(4) This concerns the treatment of truth values in more complicated situations, where we
have a mixture of agreeing and contradictory information. Again, this problem reaches
far beyond inheritance networks.
We will group (3) and (4) together in one general, ”plug-in” decision, to be found in all
approaches we discuss.
Definition 2.2
(+++*** Orig. No.: Definition 2.2 )
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A plug-in decision:
We describe now more precisely a situation which we will meet in all contexts discussed,
and whose decision goes beyond our problem - thus, we have to adopt one or several
alternatives, and translate them into the approaches we will discuss. There will be one
global decision, which is (and can be) adapted to the different contexts.
Suppose we have information about φ and ψ, where φ and ψ are presumed to be inde-
pendent - in some adequate sense.
Suppose then that we have information sources Ai : i ∈ I and Bj : j ∈ J, where the Ai
speak about φ (they say φ or ¬φ), and the Bj speak about ψ in the same way. Suppose
further that we have a partial, not necessarily transitive (!), ordering < on the information
sources Ai and Bj together. X < Y will say thatX is better (intuition: more specific) than
Y. (The potential lack of transitivity is crucial, as valid paths do not always concatenate
to valid paths - just consider the Tweety diagram.)
We also assume that there are contradictions, i.e. some Ai say φ, some ¬φ, likewise for
the Bj - otherwise, there are no problems in our context.
We can now take several approaches, all taking contradictions and the order < into
account.
• (P1) We use the global relation <, and throw away all information coming from
sources of minor quality, i.e. if there is X such that X < Y, then no information
coming from Y will be taken into account. Consequently, if Y is the only source
of information about φ, then we will have no information about φ. This seems an
overly radical approach, as one source might be better for φ, but not necessarily for
ψ, too.
If we adopt this approach, we can continue as below, and can even split in analogue
ways into (P1.1) and (P1.2), as we do below for (P2.1) and (P2.2).
• (P2) We consider the information about φ separately from the information about
ψ. Thus, we consider for φ only the Ai, for ψ only the Bj. Take now e.g. φ and the
Ai. Again, there are (at least) two alternatives.
– (P2.1) We eliminate again all sources among the Ai for which there is a better
Ai′ , irrespective of whether they agree on φ or not.
∗ (a) If the sources left are contradictory, we conclude nothing about φ, and
accept for φ none of the sources. (This is a directly sceptical approach of
treating unsolvable contradictions, following our general strategy.)
∗ (b) If the sources left agree for φ, i.e. all say φ, or all say ¬φ, then we
conclude φ (or ¬φ), and accept for φ all the remaining sources.
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– (P2.2) We eliminate again all sources among the Ai for which there is a better
Ai′ , but only if Ai and Ai′ have contradictory information. Thus, more sources
may survive than in approach (P2.1).
We now continue as for (P2.1):
∗ (a) If the sources left are contradictory, we conclude nothing about φ, and
accept for φ none of the sources.
∗ (b) If the sources left agree for φ, i.e. all say φ, or all say ¬φ, then we
conclude φ (or ¬φ), and accept for φ all the remaining sources.
The difference between (P2.1) and (P2.2) is illustrated by the following simple example.
Let A < A′ < A′′, but A 6< A′′ (recall that < is not necessarily transitive), and A |= φ,
A′ |= ¬φ, A′′ |= ¬φ. Then (P2.1) decides for φ (A is the only survivor), (P2.2) does not
decide, as A and A′′ are contradictory, and both survive in (P2.2).
There are arguments for and against either solution: (P2.1) gives a uniform picture,
more independent from φ, (P2.2) gives more weight to independent sources, it ”adds”
information sources, and thus gives potentially more weight to information from several
sources. (P2.2) seems more in the tradition of inheritance networks, so we will consider
it in the further development.
The reader should note that our approach is quite far from a fixed point approach in
two ways: First, fixed point approaches seem more appropriate for extensions based
approaches, as both try to collect a maximal set of uncontradictory information. Second,
we eliminate information when there is better, contradicting information, even if the final
result agrees with the first. This, too, contradicts in spirit the fixed point approach.
After these preparations, we turn to a formal definition of validity of paths.
The definition of |= (i.e. of validity of paths)
All definitions are relative to a fixed diagram Γ. The notion of degree will be defined
relative to all nodes of Γ, as we will work with split validity preclusion, so the paths to
consider may have different origins. For simplicity, we consider Γ to be just a set of points
and arrows, thus e.g. x→ y ∈ Γ and x ∈ Γ are defined, when x is a point in Γ, and x→ y
an arrow in Γ. Recall that we have two types of arrows, positive and negative ones.
We first define generalized and potential paths, then the notion of degree, and finally
validity of paths, written Γ |= σ, if σ is a path, as well as Γ |= xy, if Γ |= σ and
σ : x . . . .→ y.
Definition 2.3
(+++*** Orig. No.: Definition 2.3 )
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(1) Generalized paths:
A generalized path is an uninterrupted chain of positive or negative arrows pointing in
the same direction, more precisely:
x→ p ∈ Γ → x→ p is a generalized path,
x 6→ p ∈ Γ → x 6→ p is a generalized path.
If x · · · → p is a generalized path, and p → q ∈ Γ, then x · · · → p → q is a generalized
path,
if x · · · → p is a generalized path, and p 6→ q ∈ Γ, then x · · · → p 6→ q is a generalized
path.
(2) Concatenation:
If σ and τ are two generalized paths, and the end point of σ is the same as the starting
point of τ, then σ ◦ τ is the concatenation of σ and τ.
(3) Potential paths (pp.):
A generalized path, which contains at most one negative arrow, and then at the end, is a
potential path. If the last link is positive, it is a positive potential path, if not, a negative
one.
(4) Degree:
As already indicated, we shall define paths inductively. As we do not admit cycles in
our systems, the arrows define a well-founded relation on the vertices. Instead of using
this relation for the induction, we shall first define the auxiliary notion of degree, and do
induction on the degree. Given a node x (the origin), we need a (partial) mapping f from
the vertices to natural numbers such that p → q or p 6→ q ∈ Γ implies f(p) < f(q), and
define (relative to x) :
Let σ be a generalized path from x to y, then degΓ,x(σ) := degΓ,x(y) := the maximal
length of any generalized path parallel to σ, i.e. beginning in x and ending in y.
Definition 2.4
(+++*** Orig. No.: Definition 2.4 )
Inductive definition of Γ |= σ :
Let σ be a potential path.
• Case I:
σ is a direct link in Γ. Then Γ |= σ
(Recall that we have no hard contradictions in Γ.)
• Case II:
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σ is a compound potential path, degΓ,a(σ) = n, and Γ |= τ is defined for all τ with
degree less than n - whatever their origin and endpoint.
• Case II.1:
Let σ be a positive pp. x · · · → u→ y, let σ′ := x · · · → u, so σ = σ′ ◦ u→ y
Then, intuitively, Γ |= σ iff
(1) (1) σ is a candidate by upward chaining,
(2) (2) σ is not precluded by more specific contradicting information,
(3) (3) all potential contradictions are themselves precluded by information con-
tradicting them.
Note that (2) and (3) are the translation of (P2.2) in Definition 2.2.
Formally, Γ |= σ iff
(1) (1) Γ |= σ′ and u→ y ∈ Γ.
(The initial segment must be a path, as we have an upward chaining approach.
This is decided by the induction hypothesis.)
(2) (2) There are no v, τ, τ ′ such that v 6→ y ∈ Γ and Γ |= τ := x · · · → v and
Γ |= τ ′ := v · · · → u. (τ may be the empty path, i.e. x = v.)
(σ itself is not precluded by split validity preclusion and a contradictory link.
Note that τ ◦ v 6→ y need not be valid, it suffices that it is a better candidate
(by τ ′).)
(3) (3) all potentially conflicting paths are precluded by information contradicting
them:
For all v and τ such that v 6→ y ∈ Γ and Γ |= τ := x · · · → v (i.e. for all
potentially conflicting paths τ ◦ v 6→ y) there is z such that z → y ∈ Γ and
either
z = x
(the potentially conflicting pp. is itself precluded by a direct link, which is thus
valid)
or
there are Γ |= ρ := x · · · → z and Γ |= ρ′ := z · · · → v for suitable ρ and ρ′.
• Case II.2: The negative case, i.e. σ a negative pp. x · · · → u 6→ y, σ′ := x · · · → u,
σ = σ′ ◦ u 6→ y is entirely symmetrical.
Remark 2.1
(+++*** Orig. No.: Remark 2.1 )
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The following remarks all concern preclusion.
(1) Thus, in the case of preclusion, there is a valid path from x to z, and z is more specific
than v, so τ ◦ v 6→ y is precluded. Again, ρ ◦ z → y need not be a valid path, but it is
a better candidate than τ ◦ v 6→ y is, and as τ ◦ v 6→ y is in simple contradiction, this
suffices.
(2) Our definition is stricter than many usual ones, in the following sense: We require
- according to our general picture to treat only direct links as information - that the
preclusion ”hits” the precluded path at the end, i.e. v 6→ y ∈ Γ, and ρ′ hits τ ◦v 6→ y at v.
In other definitions, it is possible that the preclusion hits at some v′, which is somewhere
on the path τ, and not necessarily at its end. For instance, in the Tweety Diagram, see
Diagram 2.1, if there were a node b′ between b and d, we will need the path c → b → b′
to be valid, (obvious) validity of the arrow c→ b will not suffice.
(3) If we allow ρ to be the empty path, then the case z = x is a subcase of the present
one.
(4) Our conceptual analysis has led to a very important simplification of the definition of
validity. If we adopt on-path preclusion, we have to remember all paths which led to the
information source to be considered: In the Tweety diagram, we have to remember that
there is an arrow a→ b, it is not sufficient to note that we somehow came from a to b by
a valid path, as the path a→ c→ b→ d is precluded, but not the path a→ b→ d. If we
adopt total path preclusion, we have to remember the valid path a → c → b to see that
it precludes a→ c→ d. If we allow preclusion to ”hit” below the last node, we also have
to remember the entire path which is precluded. Thus, in all those cases, whole paths
(which can be very long) have to be remembered, but NOT in our definition.
We only need to remember (consider the Tweety diagram): (a) we want to know if
a → b → d is valid, so we have to remember a, b, d. Note that the (valid) path from a
to b can be composed and very long. (b) we look at possible preclusions, so we have to
remember a→ c 6→ d, again the (valid) path from a to c can be very long. (c) we have to
remember that the path from c to b is valid (this was decided by induction before).
So in all cases (the last one is even simpler), we need only remember the starting node,
a (or c), the last node of the valid paths, b (or c), and the information → d or 6→ d -
i.e. the size of what has to be recalled is ≤ 3. (Of course, there may be many possible
preclusions, but in all cases we have to look at a very limited situation, and not arbitrarily
long paths.)
We take a fast look forward to Section 4.3, where we describe diagrams as information
and its transfer, and nodes also as truth values. In these terms - and the reader is asked
to excuse the digression - we may note above point (a) as a⇒b d - expressing that, seen
from a, d holds with truth value b, (b) as a⇒c ¬d, (c) as c⇒c b - and this is all we need
to know.
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✷We indicate here some modifications of the definition without discussion, which is to be
found below.
(1) For on-path preclusion only: Modify condition (2) in Case II.1 to: (2′) There is no v
on the path σ (i.e. σ : x · · · → v · · · → u) such that v 6→ y ∈ Γ.
(2) For total validity preclusion: Modify condition (2) in Case II.1 to: (2′) There are no
v, τ, τ ′ such that v 6→ y ∈ Γ and τ := x · · · → v and τ ′ := v · · · → u such that Γ |= τ ◦ τ ′.
(3) For extension based approaches: Modify condition (3) in Case II.1 as follows: (3′) If
there are conflicting paths, which are not precluded themselves by contradictory infor-
mation, then we branch recursively (i.e. for all such situations) into two extensions, one,
where the positive non-precluded paths are valid, one, where the negative non-precluded
paths are valid.
Definition 2.5
(+++*** Orig. No.: Definition 2.5 )
Finally, define Γ |= xy iff there is σ : x→ y s.th. Γ |= σ, likewise for xy and σ : x · · · 6→ y.
Diagram 2.3 shows the most complicated situation for the positive case.
We have to show now that the above approach corresponds to the preceeding discussion.
Fact 2.2
(+++*** Orig. No.: Fact 2.2 )
The above definition and the one outlined in Definition 2.2 correspond.
Proof:
As Definition 2.2 is informal, this cannot be a formal proof, but it is obvious how to
transform it into one.
We argue for the result, the argument for valid paths is similar.
Consider then case (P2.2) in Definition 2.2, and start from some x.
Case 1:
Direct links, x→ z or x 6→ z.
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Diagram 2.3
♣
♣
♣
♣
♣
 
 
 
 
 ✒
♣
♣
♣
♣
♣
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅■
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ✒
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅■✻
♣
♣
♣
♣
♣
✻
♣♣♣♣♣✛
x
u v z
y
By definition, as a direct link starts at x, the information z or ¬z is stronger than all
other accessible information. Thus, the link and the information will be valid in both
approaches. Note that we assumed Γ free from hard contradictions.
Case 2:
Composite paths.
In both approaches, the initial segment has to be valid, as information will otherwise not
be accessible. Also, in both approaches, information will have the form of direct links
from the accessible source. Thus, condition (1) in Case II.1 corresponds to condition (1)
in Definition 2.2.
In both approaches, information contradicted by a stronger source (preclusion) is dis-
carded, as well as information which is contradicted by other, not precluded sources, so
(P2.2) in Definition 2.2 and II.1 (2) + (3) correspond. Note that variant (P2.1) of Defini-
tion 2.2 would give a different result - which we could, of course, also imitate in a modified
inheritance approach.
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Case 3:
Other information.
Inheritance nets give no other information, and, as pointed out, we do not add any other
information either in the approach in Definition 2.2.
Thus, both approaches are equivalent.
✷
2.3 Review of other approaches and problems
We now discuss shortly in more detail some of the differences between various major
definitions of inheritance formalisms.
Diagram 6.8, p. 179, in [Sch97-2] (which is probably due to folklore of the field) shows
requiring downward chaining would be wrong. We repeat it here, see Diagram 2.4.
Diagram 2.4
The problem of downward chaining:
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Preclusions valid above (here at u) can be invalid at lower points (here at z), as part
of the relevant information is not any more accessible (or becomes accessible). We have
u→ x 6→ y valid, by downward chaining, any valid path z → u . . . .y has to have a valid
final segment u . . . y, which can only be u→ x 6→ y, but intuition says that z → u→ v → y
should be valid. Downward chaining prevents such changes, and thus seems inadequate,
so we decide for upward chaining. (Already preclusion itself underlines upward chaining:
In the Tweety diagram, we have to know that the path from bottom up to penguins is
valid. So at least some initial subpaths have to be known - we need upward chaining.)
(The rejection of downward chaining seems at first sight to be contrary to the intuitions
carried by the word ′′inheritance′′.) See the remark in Section 4.4.
Extension-based versus directly skeptical definitions
As this distinction has already received detailed discussion in the literature, we shall
be very brief here. An extension of a net is essentially a maximally consistent and in
some appropriate sense reasonable subset of all its potential paths. This can of course
be presented either as a liberal conception (focussing on individual extensions) or as a
skeptical one (focussing on their intersection - or, the intersection of their conclusion
sets). The seminal presentation is that of [Tou86], as refined by [San86]. The directly
skeptical approach seeks to obtain a notion of skeptically accepted path and conclusion,
but without detouring through extensions. Its classic presentation is that of [HTT87].
Even while still searching for fully adequate definitions of either kind, we may use the
former approach as a useful ”control” on the latter. For if we can find an intuitively
possible and reasonable extension supporting a conclusion xy, whilst a proposed definition
for a directly skeptical notion of legitimate inference yields xy as a conclusion, then
the counterexemplary extension seems to call into question the adequacy of the directly
skeptical construction, more readily than inversely.
It has been shown in [Sch93] that the intersection of extensions is fundamentally different
from the directly sceptical approach. See the remark in Section 4.4.
From now on, all definitions considered shall be (at least) upward chaining.
On-path versus off-path preclusion
This is a rather technical distinction, discussed in [THT87]. Briefly, a path σ: x→ . . .→
y → . . .→ z and a direct link y 6→ u is an off-path preclusion of τ : x→ . . .→ z → . . .→
u, but an on-path preclusion only iff all nodes of τ between x and z lie on the path σ.
For instance, in the Tweety diagram, the arrow c 6→ d is an on-path preclusion of the
path a → c → b → d, but the paths a → c and c → b, together with c 6→ d, is an (split
validity) off-path preclusion of the path a→ b→ c.
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Split-validity versus total-validity preclusion
Consider again a preclusion σ : u → . . . → x → . . . → v, and x 6→ y of τ : u → . . . →
v → . . .→ y. Most definitions demand for the preclusion to be effective - i.e. to prevent τ
from being accepted - that the total path σ is valid. Some ([GV89], [KK89], [KKW89a],
[KKW89b]) content themselves with the combinatorially simpler separate (split) validity
of the lower and upper parts of σ: σ′ : u → . . . → x and σ′′ : x → . . . → v. In Diagram
2.5, taken from [Sch97-2], the path x → w → v is valid, so is u → x, but not the whole
preclusion path u→ x→ w → v.
Diagram 2.5
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Thus, split validity preclusion will give here the definite result uy. With total validity
preclusion, the diagram has essentially the form of a Nixon Diamond.
3 Introduction to small and big sets and the logical
systems P and R
It is natural to interpret ”normality” by some sort of ”size”: ”normality” might just mean
”majority” (perhaps with different weight given to different cases), or something like ”a
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big subset”. The standard abstraction of ”big” is the notion of a filter (or, dually, an ideal
is the abstraction of ′′small′′). We include immediately a modification, the weak versions,
to be discussed below. They seem to be minimal in the following sense: A reasonable
abstract notion of size without the properties of weak filters seems difficult to imagine:
The full set seems the best candidate for a ”big” subset, ”big” should cooperate with
inclusion, and, finally, no set should be big and small at the same time.
Definition 3.1
(+++*** Orig. No.: Definition 3.1 )
Fix a base set X.
A (weak) filter on or over X is a set F ⊆ P(X) - P(X) the power set of X -, such that
(F1)− (F3) ((F1), (F2), (F3′) respectively) hold:
(F1) X ∈ F
(F2) A ⊆ B ⊆ X, A ∈ F imply B ∈ F
(F3) A,B ∈ F imply A ∩ B ∈ F
(F3′) A,B ∈ F imply A ∩B 6= ∅.
So a weak filter satisfies (F3′) instead of (F3).
An (weak) ideal on or over X is a set I ⊆ P(X), such that (I1)− (I3) ((I1), (I2), (I3′)
respectively) hold: (I1) ∅ ∈ I
(I2) A ⊆ B ⊆ X, B ∈ I imply A ∈ I
(I3) A,B ∈ I imply A ∪ B ∈ I
(I3′) A,B ∈ I imply A ∪ B 6= X.
So a weak ideal satisfies (I3′) instead of (I3).
Elements of a filter on X are called big subsets of X, their complements are called small,
and the rest have ”medium size”. The set of the X−complements of the elements of a
filter form an ideal, and vice versa. Note that these notions of ”big” and ”small” are by
definition relative to the base set X. This is a different, additional notion of relativity
than the one we will see in Section 5.
These notions are related to nonmonotonic logics as follows:
We can say that, normally, φ implies ψ iff in a big subset of all φ−cases, ψ holds. In
preferential terms, φ implies ψ iff ψ holds in all minimal φ−models. If µ is the model
choice function of a preferential structure, i.e. µ(φ) is the set of minimal φ−models, then
µ(φ) will be a (the smallest) big subset of the set of φ−models, and the filter over the
φ−models is the pricipal filter generated by µ(φ).
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Due to the finite intersection property, filters and ideals work well with logics: If φ holds
normally, as it holds in a big subset, and so does φ′, then φ∧φ′ will normally hold, too, as
the intersection of two big subsets is big again. This is a nice property, but not justified
in all situations, consider e.g. simple counting of a finite subset. (The question has a
name, ”lottery paradox”: normally no single participant wins, but someone wins in the
end.) This motivates the weak versions.
Normality defined by (weak or not) filters is a local concept: the filter defined on X and
the one defined on X ′ might be totally independent. Consider, however, the following
two situations: Let Y ′ be a big subset of X ′, X ⊆ X ′, and Y ′ ⊆ X. If ”size” has any
absolute meaning, then Y ′ should be a big subset of X, too. On the other hand, let X
and X ′ be big subsets of Y, then there are good reasons (analogue to those justifying
the intersection property of filters) to assume that X ∩ X ′ is also a big subset of X ′.
These set properties are strongly connected to logical properties: For instance, if the
latter property holds, we can deduce the logical property Cautious Monotony (see below
for a formal definition): If ψ implies normally φ and φ′, because the sets X and X ′ of
ψ ∧ φ−models and ψ ∧ φ′−models are big subsets of the set Y of ψ−models, then ψ ∧ φ′
will imply normally φ too, as the set X ∩X ′ of ψ ∧ φ∧ φ′−models will be a big subset of
the set X ′ of ψ ∧ φ′−models.
More precisely, the reasoning is (a little simplified) as follows: If A and A′ are small
subsets of B, then A will also be a small subset of B-A’. Changing the reference set B
just a little will not affect size. (In more detail: If A and A′ are small subsets of B,
then A-A’ will also be a small subset of B − A′.) Note that ”small” is used here in two
conceptually very different ways: (1) ψ ∼| φ iff the set of ψ∧¬φ−models is a small subset
of the ψ−models, (2) when we change the reference class B just a little bit, relative size
is preserved.
Seen more abstractly, such set properties allow the transfer of big subsets from one to
another base set (and the conclusions drawn on this basis), and we call them ”coherence
properties”. They are very important, not only for working with a logic which respects
them, but also for soundness and completeness questions, often they are at the core of
such problems. The reader is invited to read the articles by Ben-David and Ben-Eliyahu
[BB94] and Friedman and Halpern [FH98], which treat essentially the same questions in
different languages (and perhaps their comparison by the author in [Sch97-4] and [Sch04]).
These notions are tied to logical properties as follows:
The left hand column presents the single formula version, the center column the theory
version (a theory is, for us, an arbitrary set of formulas), the right hand column the
algebraic version, describing the choice function on the model set, e.g. f(X) ⊆ X cor-
responds to the rule φ ⊢ ψ implies φ ∼| ψ in the formula version, and to T ⊆ T in the
theory version. A short discussion of some of the properties follows the table.
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(PR) is also called infinite conditionalization - we choose the name for its central role for
preferential structures. Note that in the presence of (µ ⊆), and if Y is closed under finite
intersections, (µPR) is equivalent to
(µPR′) f(X) ∩ Y ⊆ f(X ∩ Y ).
The system of rules (AND), (OR), (LLE), (RW), (SC), (CP), (CM), (CUM) is also called
system P (for preferential), adding (RM) gives the system R (for rationality or ranked-
ness).
(LLE), (RW), (CCL) will all hold automatically, whenever we work with fixed model sets.
(SC) corresponds to the choice of a subset. (CP) is somewhat delicate, as it presupposes
that the chosen model set is non-empty. This might fail in the presence of ever better
choices, without ideal ones. (PR) is an inifinitary version of one half of the deduction
theorem: Let T stand for φ, T ′ for ψ, and φ∧ψ ∼| σ, so φ ∼| ψ → σ, but (ψ → σ)∧ψ ⊢ σ.
(CUM) (whose most interesting half in our context is (CM)) may best be seen as normal
use of lemmas: We have worked hard and found some lemmas. Now we can take a rest,
and come back again with our new lemmas. Adding them to the axioms will neither
add new theorems, nor prevent old ones to hold. (RM) is perhaps best understood by
looking at big and small subsets. If the set of φ ∧ ψ−models is a big subset of the set of
φ−models, and the set of φ ∧ ψ′−models is a not a small subset of the set of φ−models
(i.e. big or of medium size), then the set of φ ∧ ψ ∧ ψ′−models is a big subset of the set
of φ ∧ ψ′−models. Again, we have a double use of small/big here.
Definition 3.2
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(AND) (AND)
φ ∼| ψ, φ ∼| ψ′ ⇒ T ∼| ψ, T ∼| ψ′ ⇒
φ ∼| ψ ∧ ψ′ T ∼| ψ ∧ ψ′
(OR) (OR) (µ ∪w) - w for weak
φ ∼| ψ, φ′ ∼| ψ ⇒ T ∼| ψ, T ′ ∼| ψ ⇒ f(A ∪B) ⊆ f(A) ∪ f(B)
φ ∨ φ′ ∼| ψ T ∨ T ′ ∼| ψ
(LLE) or (LLE)
Left Logical Equivalence
⊢ φ↔ φ′, φ ∼| ψ ⇒ T = T ′ ⇒ T = T ′
φ′ ∼| ψ
(RW) or Right Weakening (RW)
φ ∼| ψ,⊢ ψ → ψ′ ⇒ T ∼| ψ,⊢ ψ → ψ′ ⇒
φ ∼| ψ′ T ∼| ψ′
(CCL) or Classical Closure (CCL)
T is classically
closed
(SC) or Supraclassicality (SC) (µ ⊆)
φ ⊢ ψ ⇒ φ ∼| ψ T ⊆ T f(X) ⊆ X
(CP) or (CP) (µ∅)
Consistency Preservation
φ ∼| ⊥ ⇒ φ ⊢ ⊥ T ∼| ⊥ ⇒ T ⊢ ⊥ f(X) = ∅ ⇒ X = ∅
(RM) or Rational Monotony (RM) (µ =)
φ ∼| ψ, φ 6∼| ψ′ ⇒ T ∼| ψ, T 6∼| ψ′ ⇒ X ⊆ Y, Y ∩ f(X) 6= ∅ ⇒
φ ∧ ψ′ ∼| ψ T ∪ {ψ′} ∼| ψ f(X) = f(Y ) ∩X
(CM) or Cautious Monotony (CM)
φ ∼| ψ, φ ∼| ψ′ ⇒ T ⊆ T ′ ⊆ T ⇒ f(X) ⊆ Y ⊆ X ⇒
φ ∧ ψ ∼| ψ′ T ⊆ T ′ f(Y ) ⊆ f(X)
(CUM) or Cumulativity (CUM) (µCUM)
φ ∼| ψ ⇒ T ⊆ T ′ ⊆ T ⇒ f(X) ⊆ Y ⊆ X ⇒
(φ ∼| ψ′ ⇔ φ ∧ ψ ∼| ψ′) T = T ′ f(Y ) = f(X)
(PR) (µPR)
φ ∧ φ′ ⊆ φ ∪ {φ′} T ∪ T ′ ⊆ T ∪ T ′ X ⊆ Y ⇒
f(Y ) ∩X ⊆ f(X)
We recall that smooth preferential models generate the system P, whereas smooth ranked
models generate the system R - see e.g. [KLM90] or [Sch04] for details.
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4 Interpretations
4.1 Introduction
We will discuss in this Section three interpretations of inheritance nets.
First, we will indicate fundamental differences between inheritance and the systems P
and R, they will be elaborated in Section 5, where an interpretation in terms of small sets
will be tried nonetheless.
Second, we will interpret inheritance nets as systems of information and information flow.
Third, we will interpret inheritance nets as systems of prototypes.
Inheritance nets present many intuitively attractive properties, thus it is not surprising
that we can interpret them in several ways. Similarly, preferential structures can be used
as a semantics for deontic, and for nonmonotonic logic, they express a common idea:
choosing a subset of models by a binary relation. Thus, such an ambiguity need not be a
sign for a basic flaw.
4.2 Informal comparison of inheritance with the systems P and
R
The main issues
In the author’s opinion, the following two properties of inheritance diagrams show the
deepest difference to preferential and similar semantics, and the first even to classical
logic. They have to be taken seriously, as they are at the core of inheritance systems, are
independent of the particular formalism, and show that there is a fundamental difference
between the former and the latter. Consequently, any attempt at translation will have to
stretch one or both sides perhaps beyond the breaking point.
(1) Relevance,
(2) subideal situations, or relative normality
Both (and more) can be illustrated by the following simple Diagram 4.1 (which also shows
conflict resolution by specificity).
(1) Relevance: As there is no monotonous path whatever between e and d, the question
whether e’s are d’s or not, or vice versa, does not even arise. For the same reason, there
is no question whether b’s are c′s, or not. (As a matter of fact, we will see below that b’s
are non-c’s in system P - see Definition 3.2). In upward chaining formalisms, as there is
no valid positive path from a to d, there is no question either whether a’s are f’s or not.
The problem of relevance has a trivial answer in upward chaining inheritance nets: there
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must be some valid initial segment in the diagram to establish relevance.
Of course, in classical logic, all information is relevant to the rest, so we can say e.g. that
e’s are d′s, or e’s are non− d′s, or some are d′s, some are not, but there is a connection.
As preferential models are based on classical logic, the same argument applies to them.
(2) In our diagram, a’s are b′s, but not ideal b′s, as they are not d′s, the more specific
information from c wins. But they are e′s, as ideal b’s are. So they are not perfectly ideal
b′s, but as ideal b’s as possible. Thus, we have graded ideality, which does not exist in
preferential and similar structures. In those structures, if an element is an ideal element,
it has all properties of such, if one such property is lacking, it is not ideal, and we can′t
say anything any more. Here, however, we sacrifice as little normality as possible, it is
thus a minimal change formalism.
In comparison, questions of information transfer and strength of information seem lesser
differences. Already systems P and R (see Definition 3.2) differ on information transfer.
In both cases, transfer is based on the same notion of smallness, which describes ideal
situations. But, as said in Section 3, conceptually, this is very different from the use of
”ideal-smallness”, describing normal situations. Thus, it can be considered also on this
level an independent question, and we can imagine systems based on absolutely ideal
situations for normality, but with a totally different transfer mechanism.
For these reasons, extending preferential and related semantics to cover inheritance nets
seems to stretch them to the breaking point, Thus, we should also look for other interpre-
tations. (The term ”interpretation” is used here in a non-technical sense.) In particular,
it seems worth while to connect inheritance systems to other problems, and see whether
there are similarities there. This is what we do now. We come back to the systems P and
R in Section 5.
4.3 Inheritance as information transfer
An informal argument showing parallel ideas common to inheritance with an upward
chaining formalism and information transfer is as follows: First, arrows represent certainly
some kind of information, of the kind ”most a’s are b′s” or so. (See Diagram 4.1.) Second,
to be able to use information, e.g. ”d’s are f ′s” at a, we have to be able to connect
from a to d by a valid path, this information has to be made accessible to a, or, in other
terms, a working information channel from a to d has to be established. Third, specificity
(when present) decides conflicts (we take the split validity approach). This can be done
procedurally, or, perhaps simpler and certainly in a more transparent way, by assigning a
comparison of information strength to valid paths. Now, information strength may also
be called truth value (to use a term familiar in logic) and the natural entity at hand is
the node itself - this is just a cheap formal trick without any conceptual meaning.
When we adopt this view, nodes and arrows (and valid paths) have multiple functions,
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and it may seem that we overload the (deceptively) simple picture. But it is perhaps the
charm and the utility and naturalness of inheritance systems that they are not ”clean”,
and hide many complications under a simple surface, as human common sense reasoning
often does, too.
In a certain way, this is a poor man’s interpretation, as it does not base inheritance on
another formalism, but gives only an intuitive reading. Yet, it gives a connection to other
branches of reasoning, and is as such already justified - in the author’s opinion. Moreover,
our analysis makes a clear distinction between arrows and composite valid paths. This
distinction is implicit in inheritance formalisms, we make it explicit through our concepts.
But this interpretation is by no means the only one, and can only be suggested as a
possibility.
We will now first give the details, and then discuss our interpretation.
(1) Information:
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Direct arrows (negative or positive) represent information, valid for their source. Thus,
in a set reading, if there is an arrow A → B in the diagram, most elements of A will be
in B, in short: ”most A′s are B′s” - and A 6→ B will mean that most A′s are not B′s.
(2) Information sources and flow:
Nodes are information sources. If A → B is in the diagram, A is the source of the
information ”most A′s are B′s”.
A valid, composed or atomic positive path σ from U to A makes the information of
source A accessible to U. One might also say that A′s information becomes relevant to U.
Otherwise, information is considered independent - only (valid) positive paths create the
dependencies.
(If we want to conform to inheritance, we must not add trivialities like ”x’s are x′s”, as
this would require x→ x in the corresponding net, which, of course, will not be there in
an acyclic net.)
(3) Information strength:
A valid, composed or atomic positive path σ from A′ to A allows us to compare the
strength of information source A′ with that of A : A′ is stronger than A. (In the set
reading, this comparison is the result of specificity: more specific information is considered
more reliable.) If there is no such valid path, we cannot resolve contradictions between
information from A and A′. This interpretation results in split validity preclusion: the
comparison between information sources A′ and A is absolute, and does NOT depend
on the U from which both may be accessible - as can be the case with total validity
preclusion. Of course, if desired, we can also adopt this (much more complicated) idea.
Nodes are also truth values. They are the strength of the information whose source they
are. (This might seem an abuse of nodes, but we already have them, so why not use
them?)
Discussion:
Considering direct arrows as information meets probably with little objection.
The conclusion of a valid path (e.g. if σ : a→ b is valid, then its conclusion is ”a’s are b′s”)
is certainly also information, but it has a status different from the information of a direct
link, so we should distinguish it clearly. At least in upward chaining formalisms, using
the path itself as some channel through which information flows, and not the conclusion,
seems more natural. The conclusion says little about the inner structure of the path,
which is very important in inheritance networks, e.g. for preclusion. When calculating
validity of paths, we look at (sub- and other) paths, but not their results, and should also
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express this clearly.
Once we accept this picture of valid positive paths as information channels, it is natural
to see their upper ends as information sources.
Our interpretation supports upward chaining, and vice versa, upward chaining supports
our interpretation.
One of the central ideas of inheritance is preclusion, which, in the case of split validity
preclusion, works by an absolute comparison between nodes. Thus, if we accept split valid-
ity preclusion, it is natural to see valid positive paths as comparisons between information
of different strengths. Conversely, if we accept absolute comparison of information, we
should also accept split validity preclusion - these interpretations support each other.
Whatever type of preclusion we accept, preclusion clearly compares information strength,
and allows us to decide for the stronger one. We can see this procedurally, or by giving
different values to different information (depending on the source), which we can call truth
values to connect our picture to other areas of logic. It is then natural - as we have it
already - to use the source node itself as truth value, with comparison via valid positive
paths.
Illustration:
Thus, in a given node U, information from A is accessible iff there is a valid positive path
from U to A, and if information from A′ is also accessible, and there is a valid positive
path from A′ to A, then, in case of conflict, information from A′ wins over that from A, as
A′ has a better truth value. In the Tweety diagram, see Diagram 2.1, Tweety has access
to penguins and birds, the horizontal link from penguin to bird compares the strengths,
and the fly/not fly arrows are the information.
A negative direct link can only be information. A positive direct link is information at its
source, but it can also be a comparison of truth values, or it can give access from its source
to information at its end. A valid positive, composed path can only be comparison of
truth values, or give access to information, it is NOT information itself. A valid negative
composed path has no function, only its parts have.
We obtain automatically that direct information is stronger than any other information:
If A has information φ, and there is a valid path from A to B, making B’s information
accessible to A, then this same path also compares strength, and A′s information is
stronger than B’s information. Seen from A, i.e. just considering information accessible
to A, A′s own information will always be best.
Our interpretation underlines the importance of initial segments: Initial segments make
information accessible. Thus, initial segments have to be valid.
Inheritance diagrams in this interpretation do not only represent reasoning with many
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truth values, but also reasoning ABOUT those truth values: their comparison is done by
the same underlying mechanism.
Further comments:
Our reading also covers enriched diagrams, where arbitrary information can be ”ap-
pended” to a node.
An alternative way to see a source of information is to see it as a reason to believe the
information it gives. U needs a reason to believe something, i.e. a valid path from U to
the source of the information, and also a reason to disbelieve, i.e. if U ′ is below U, and
U believes and U ′ does NOT believe some information of A, then either U ′ has stronger
information to the contrary, or there is not a valid path to A any more (and neither to
any other possible source of this information). (′′Reason′′, a concept very important in
this context, was introduced by A.Bochman into the discussion.)
The restriction that negative links can only be information applies to traditional inher-
itance networks, and the author makes no claim whatever that it should also hold for
modified such systems, or in still other contexts. One of the reasons why we do not have
”negative nodes”, and thus negated arrows also in the middle of paths might be the fol-
lowing (with C complementation): If, for some X, we also have a node for CX, then we
should have X 6→ CX and CX 6→ X, thus a cycle, and arrows from Y to X should be
accompanied by their opposite to CX, etc. This would complicate the picture, perhaps
without any real gain in insight.
We translate the analysis and decision of Definition 2.2 now into the picture of information
sources, accessibility, and comparison via valid paths. This is straightforward:
(1) We have that information from Ai, i ∈ I, about B is accessible from U, i.e. there are
valid positive paths from U to all Ai. Some Ai may say ¬B, some B.
(2) If information from Ai is comparable with information from Aj (i.e. there is a valid
positive path from Ai to Aj or the other way around), and Ai contradicts Aj with respect
to B, then the weaker information is discarded.
(3) There remains a (nonempty, by lack of cycles) set of the Ai, such that for no such Ai
there is Aj with better contradictory information about B. If the information from this
remaining set is contradictory, we accept none (and none of the paths either), if not, we
accept the common conclusion and all these paths.
We continue now Remark 2.1, (4), and turn this into a formal system.
Fix a diagram Γ, and do an induction as in Definition 2.2.
Definition 4.1
(+++*** Orig. No.: Definition 4.1 )
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(1) We distinguish a ⇒ b and a ⇒x b, where the intuition of a ⇒x b is: we know with
strength x that a’s are b′s, and of a ⇒ b that it has been decided taking all information
into consideration that a⇒ b holds.
(2) a→ b implies a→a b, likewise a 6→ b implies a→a ¬b.
(3) a⇒a b implies a⇒ b, likewise a⇒a ¬b implies a⇒ ¬b. This expresses the fact that
direct arrows are uncontested.
(4) a ⇒ b and b ⇒b c imply a ⇒b c, likewise for b ⇒b ¬c. This expresses concatenation
- but without deciding if it is accepted! Note we cannot make a ⇒ b and b ⇒ c imply
a⇒b c a rule, as this would make concatenation of two composed paths possible.
(5) We decide acceptance of composed paths as in Definition 2.2, where preclusion uses
accepted paths for deciding.
Note that we also reason in this system about relative strength of truth values, which are
just nodes, this is then, of course, used in the acceptance condition, in preclusion, more
precisely.
4.4 Inheritance as reasoning with prototypes
Some of the issues we discuss here apply also to the more general picture of information
and its transfer. We present them here for motivational reasons: it seems easier to discuss
them in the (somewhat!) more concrete setting of prototypes than in the very general
situation of information handling. These issues will be indicated.
It seems natural to see information in inheritance networks as information about proto-
types. (We do not claim that our use of the word ”prototype” has more than a vague
relation to the use in psychology. We do not try to explain the usefulness of prototypes
either, one possibility is that there are reasons why birds fly, and why penguins don′t,
etc.) In the Tweety diagram, we will thus say that prototypical birds will fly, prototypical
penguins will not fly. More precisely, the property ”fly” is part of the bird prototype, the
property ′′¬fly′′ part of the penguin prototype. Thus, the information is given for some
node, which defines its application or domain (bird or penguin in our example) - beyond
this node, the property is not defined (unless inherited, of course). It might very well be
that no element of the domain has ALL the properties of the prototype, every bird may
be exceptional in some sense. This again shows that we are very far from the ideal picture
of small and big subsets as used in systems P and R. (This, of course, goes beyond the
problem of prototypes.)
Of course, we will want to ”inherit” properties of prototypes, for instance in Diagram 4.1,
a ”should” inherit the property e from b, and the property ¬d from c. Informally, we will
argue as follows: ”Prototypical a’s have property b, and prototypical b’s have property e,
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so it seems reasonable to assume that prototypical a’s also have property e - unless there
is better information to the contrary.” A plausible solution is then to use upward chaining
inheritance as described above to find all relevant information, and then compose the
prototype.
We discuss now three points whose importance goes beyond the treatment of prototypes:
(1) Using upward chaining has an additional intuitive appeal: We consider information at
a the best, so we begin with b (and c), and only then, tentatively, add information e from
b. Thus, we begin with strongest information, and add weaker information successively -
this seems good reasoning policy.
(2) In upward chaining, we also collect information at the source (the end of the path), and
do not use information which was already filtered by going down - thus the information
we collect has no history, and we cannot encounter problems of iterated revision, which
are problems of history of change. (In downward chaining, we only store the reasons why
something holds, but not why something does not hold, so we cannot erase this negative
information when the reason is not valid any more. This is an asymmetry apparently not
much noted before. Consider Diagram 2.4. Here, the reason why u does not accept y as
information, but ¬y, is the preclusion via x. But from z, this preclusion is not valid any
more, so the reason why y was rejected is not valid any more, and y can now be accepted.)
(3) We come back to the question of extensions vs. direct scepticism. Consider the
Nixon Diamond, Diagram 2.2. Suppose Nixon were a subclass of Republican and Quaker.
Then the extensions approach reasons as follows: Either the Nixon class prototype has
the pacifist property, or the hawk property, and we consider these two possibilities. But
this is not sufficient: The Nixon class prototype might have neither property - they are
normally neither pacifists, nor hawks, but some are this, some are that. So the conceptual
basis for the extensions approach does not hold: ”Tertium non datur” just simply does
not hold (as in Intuitionist Logic, where we may have neither a proof for φ, nor for ¬φ).
Once we fixed this decision, i.e. how to find the relevant information, we can still look
upward or downward in the net and investigate the changes between the prototypes in
going upward or downward, as follows: E.g., in above example, we can look at the node
a and its prototype, and then at the change going from a to b, or, conversely, look at b
and its prototype, and then at the change going from b to a. The problem of finding the
information, and this dynamics of information change have to be clearly separated.
In both cases, we see the following:
(1) The language is kept small, and thus efficient.
For instance, when we go from a to b, information about c is lost, and ”c” does not figure
any more in the language, but f is added. When we go from b to a, f is lost, and c is won.
In our simple picture, information is independent, and contradictions are always between
two bits of information.
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(2) Changes are kept small, and need a reason to be effective. Contradictory, stronger
information will override the old one, but no other information, except in the following
case: making new information (in-) accessible will cause indirect changes, i.e. information
now made (in-) accessible via the new node. This is similar to formalisms of causation:
if a reason is not there any more, its effects vanish, too.
It is perhaps more natural when going downward also to consider ”subsets”, as follows:
Consider Diagram 4.1. b’s are d′s, and c’s are ¬d′s, and c’s are also b′s. So it seems
plausible to go beyond the language of inheritance nets, and conclude that b’s which are
not c’s will be d′s, in short to consider (b − c)′s. It is obvious which such subsets to
consider, and how to handle them: For instance, loosely speaking, in b ∩ d e will hold,
in b ∩ c ∩ d ¬f will hold, in b ∩ d ∩ Cc f will hold, etc. This is just putting the bits of
information together.
We turn to another consideration, which will also transcend the prototype situation and
we will (partly) use the intuition that nodes stand for sets, and arrows for (soft) inclusion
in a set or its complement.
In this reading, specificity stands for soft set inclusion. So, if b and c are visible from a,
and there is a valid path from c to b (as in Diagram 4.1), then a is a subset both of b
and c, and c a subset of b, so a ⊆ c ⊆ b (softly). But then a is closer to c than a is to b.
Automatically, a will be closest to itself.
When we go now from b to c, we loose information d and f, win information ¬d, but keep
information e. Thus, this is minimal change: we give up (and win) only the necessary
information, but keep the rest. As our language is very simple, we can use the Hamming
distance between formula sets here. (We will make a remark on more general situations
just below.)
When we look now again from a, we take the set-closest class (c), and use the information
of c, which was won by minimal change (i.e. the Hamming closest) from information
of b. So we have the interplay of two distances, where the set distance certainly is not
symmetrical, as we need valid paths for access and comparison. If there is no such valid
path, it is reasonable to make the distance infinite.
The promised remark on more general situations: in richer languages, we cannot count
formulas to determine the Hamming distance between two situations (i.e. models or
model sets), but have to take the difference in propositional variables. Consider e.g. the
language with two variables, p and q. The models (described by) p ∧ q and p ∧ ¬q have
distance 1, whereas p ∧ q and ¬p ∧ ¬q have distance 2. Note that this distance is NOT
robust under re-definition of the language. Let p′ stand for (p∧ q)∨ (¬p∧¬q), and q′ for
q. Of course, p′ and q′ are equivalent descriptions of the same model set, as we can define
all the old singletons also in the new language. Then the situations p ∧ q and ¬p ∧ ¬q
have now distance 1, as one corresponds to p′ ∧ q′, the other to p′ ∧ ¬q′.
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There might be misunderstandings about the use of the word ”distance” here. The author
is fully aware that inheritance networks cannot be captured by distance semantics in the
sense of preferential structures. But we do NOT think here of distances from one fixed
ideal point, but of relativized distances: Every prototype is the origin of measurements.
E.g., the bird prototype is defined by ”flying, laying eggs, having feathers . . . .”. So we
presume that all birds have these properties of the prototype, i.e. distance 0 from the
prototype. When we see that penguins do not fly, we move as little as possible from the
bird prototype, so we give up ”flying”, but not the rest. Thus, penguins (better: the
penguin prototype) will have distance 1 from the bird prototype (just one property has
changed). So there is a new prototype for penguins, and considering penguins, we will
not measure from the bird prototype, but from the penguin prototype, so the point of
reference changes. This is exactly as in distance semantics for theory revision, introduced
in [LMS01], only the point of reference is not the old theory T, but the old prototype, and
the distance is a very special one, counting properties assumed to be independent. (The
picture is a little bit more complicated, as the loss of one property (flying) may cause
other modifications, but the simple picture suffices for this informal argument.)
We conclude this Section with two remarks, the first on prototypes, the second a general
remark on preclusion in inheritance systems.
Realistic prototypical reasoning will probably neither always be upward, nor always be
downward. A medical doctor will not begin with the patient’s most specific category
(name and birthday or so), nor will he begin with all he knows about general objects.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to investigate upward and downward reasoning here.
Obviously, in some cases, it need not be specificity, which decides conflicts. Consider
the case where Tweety is a bird, but a dead animal. Obviously, Tweety will not fly,
here because the predicate ”dead” is very strong and overrules many normal properties.
When we generalize this, we might have a hierarchy of causes, where one overrules the
other, or the result may be undecided. For instance, a falling object might be attracted
in a magnetic field, but a gusty wind might prevent this, sometimes, with unpredictable
results. This is then additional information (strength of cause), and this problem is
not addressed directly in traditional inheritance networks, we would have to introduce a
subclass ”dead bird” - and subclasses often have properties of ”pseudo-causes”, being a
penguin probably is not a ”cause” for not flying, nor bird for flying, still, things change
from class to subclass for a reason.
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5 Detailed translation of inheritance to modified sys-
tems of small sets
5.1 Normality
As we saw already in Section 4.2, normality in inheritance (and Reiter defaults etc.) is
relative, and as much normality as possible is preserved. There is no absolute N(X), but
only N(X, φ), and N(X, φ) might be defined, but not N(X,ψ). Normality in the sense of
preferential structures is absolute: if x is not in N(X) (= µ(X) in preferential reading),
we do not know anything beyond classical logic. This is the dark Swedes’ problem: even
dark Swedes should probably be tall. Inheritance systems are different: If birds usually
lay eggs, then penguins, though abnormal with respect to flying, will still usually lay eggs.
Penguins are fly-abnormal birds, but will continue to be egg-normal birds - unless we have
again information to the contrary. So the absolute, simple N(X) of preferential structures
splits up into many, by default independent, normalities, N(X, φ) for φ−normal etc. This
corresponds to intuition: There are no absolutely normal birds, each one is particular in
some sense, so
⋂
{N(X, φ) : φ ∈ L} may well be empty, even if each single N(X, φ) is
almost all birds.
What are the laws of relative normality? N(X, φ) andN(X,ψ) will be largely independent
(except for trivial situations, where φ ↔ ψ, φ is a tautology, etc.). N(X, φ) might be
defined, and N(X,ψ) not. Thus, if there is no arrow, or no path, between X and Y, then
N(X, Y ) and N(Y,X) - where X,Y are also properties - need not be defined. This will get
rid of the unwanted connections found with absolute normalities, as illustrated by Fact
5.1.
We interpret now ”normal” by ”big set”, i.e. essentially ′′φ holds normally in X iff there
is a big subset of X, where φ holds”. This will, of course, be modified.
5.2 Small sets
The main interest of this Section is perhaps to show the adaptations of the concept of
small/big subsets necessary for a more ”real life” situation, where we have to relativize.
The amount of changes we do illustrates the problems and what can be done, but also
perhaps what should not be done, as the concept is stretched too far.
The usual informal way of speaking about inheritance networks (plus other considerations)
motivates an interpretation by sets and soft set inclusion - A→ B means that ”most A′s
are B′s”. Just as with normality, the ”most” will have to be relativized, i.e. there is a
B−normal part of A, and a B−abnormal one, and the first is B−bigger than the second
- where ”bigger” is relative to B, too. (A further motivation for this set interpretation
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is the often evoked specificity argument for preclusion. Thus, we will now translate our
remarks about normality into the language of big and small subsets.)
Recall our remarks about relative normality. N(X, φ) is, a priori, independent of N(X,ψ),
and N(X, φ) might be defined, but not N(X,ψ). Thus, we will have φ−big subsets of X,
and ψ−big subsets, and the two are essentially independent, may perhaps even have an
empty intersection, only one may be defined, etc.
Consider now the system P (with Cumulativity), see Definition 3.2. Small sets (see
Definition 3.1) are used in two conceptually very distinct ways: α ∼| β iff the set of
α ∧ ¬β−cases is a small subset (in the absolute sense, there is just one system of big
subsets of the α−cases) of the set of α−cases. The second use is in information transfer,
used in Cumulativity, or Cautious Monotony more precisely: if the set of α ∧ ¬γ−cases
is a small subset of the set of α−cases, then α ∼| β carries over to α∧ γ : α∧ γ ∼| β. (See
also the discussion in [Sch04], page 86, after Definition 2.3.6.) It is this transfer which we
will consider here, and not things like AND, which connect different N(X, φ) for different
φ.
Before we go into details, we will show that e.g. the system P is too strong to model
inheritance systems, and that e.g. the system R is to weak for this purpose. Thus,
preferential systems are really quite different from inheritance systems.
Fact 5.1
(+++*** Orig. No.: Fact 5.1 )
(a) System P is too strong to capture inheritance.
(b) System R is too weak to capture inheritance.
Proof:
(a) Consider the Tweety diagram, Diagram 2.1. c → b → d, c 6→ d. There is no arrow
b 6→ c, and we will see that P forces one to be there. For this, we take the natural
translation, i.e. X → Y will be ′′X ∩ Y is a big subset of X ′′, etc. We show that c ∩ b
is a small subset of b, which we write c ∩ b < b. c ∩ b = (c ∩ b ∩ d) ∪ (c ∩ b ∩ Cd).
c ∩ b ∩Cd ⊆ b ∩Cd < b, the latter by b → d, thus c ∩ b ∩Cd < b, essentially by Right
Weakening. Set now X := c ∩ b ∩ d. As c 6→ d, X := c ∩ b ∩ d ⊆ c ∩ d < c, and by
the same reasoning as above X < c. It remains to show X < b. We use now c → b. As
c ∩Cb < c, and c ∩X < c, by Cumulativity X = c ∩X ∩ b < c ∩ b, so essentially by OR
X = c ∩X ∩ b < b. Using the filter property, we see that c ∩ b < b.
(b) Second, even R is too weak: In the diagram X → Y → Z, we want to conclude that
most of X is in Z, but as X might also be a small subset of Y, we cannot transfer the
information ”most Y’s are in Z ′′ to X.
✷
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We have to distinguish direct information/arrows from inherited information/valid paths.
In the language of big/small sets, it is easiest to do this by two types of big subsets: big
ones and very big ones. We will denote the first big, the second BIG. This corresponds
to the distinction between a⇒ b and a⇒a b in Definition 4.1.
In particular, we will have the implications BIG → big and SMALL → small, so we
have nested systems. Such systems were discussed in [Sch95-1], see also [Sch97-2].
In particular, this distinction seems to be necessary to prevent arbitrary concatenation of
valid paths to valid paths, which would lead to contradictions. Consider e.g. a → b →
c→ d, a→ e 6→ d, e→ c. Then concatenating a→ b with b→ c→ d, both valid, would
lead to a simple contradiction with a → e 6→ d, and not to preclusion, as it should be -
see below.
For the situation X → Y → Z, we will then conclude that:
If Y ∩ Z is a Z−BIG subset of Y and X ∩ Y is a Y−big subset of X then X ∩ Z is a
Z−big subset of X. (We generalize already to the case where there is a valid path from
X to Y.)
We call this procedure information transfer.
Y → Z expresses the direct information in this context, so Y ∩ Z has to be a Z−BIG
subset of Y.
X → Y can be direct information, but it is used here as channel of information flow, in
particular it might be a composite valid path, so in our context, X ∩Y is a Y−big subset
of X.
X ∩Z is a Z−big subset of X : this can only be big, and not BIG, as we have a composite
path.
The translation into big/small subsets and their modifications is now quite complicated:
we seem to have to relativize, and we seem to need two types of big/small. This casts,
of course, a doubt on the enterprise of translation. The future will tell if any of the ideas
can be used in other contexts.
We investigate this situation now in more detail, first without conflicts.
The way we cut the problem is not the only possible one. We were guided by the idea
that we should stay close to usual argumentation about big/small sets, should proceed
carefully, i.e. step by step, and should take a general approach.
Note that we start without any X−big subsets defined, so X is not even a X−big subset
of itself.
(A) The simple case of two arrows, and no conflicts.
(In slight generalization:) If information φ is appended at Y, and Y is accessible from X
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(and there is no better information about φ available), φ will be valid at X. For simplicity,
suppose there is a direct positive link from X to Y, written sloppily X → Y |= φ.
In the big subset reading, we will interpret this as: Y ∧ φ is a φ−BIG subset of Y. It is
important that this is now direct information, so we have ”BIG” and not ”big”.
We read now X → Y also as: X ∩ Y is an Y−big subset of X - this is the channel, so
just ”big”.
We want to conclude by transfer that X ∩ φ is a φ−big subset of X.
We do this in two steps: First, we conclude that X ∩ Y ∩ φ is a φ−big subset of X ∩ Y,
and then, as X ∩ Y is an Y−big subset of X, X ∩ φ itself is a φ−big subset of X. We do
NOT conclude that (X − Y ) ∩ φ is a φ−big subset of X-Y, this is very important, as we
want to preserve the reason of being φ−big subsets - and this goes via Y !
The transition from ”BIG” to ”big” should be at the first step, where we conclude that
X ∩ Y ∩ φ is a φ−big (and not φ−BIG) subset of X ∩ Y, as it is really here where things
happen, i.e. transfer of information from Y to arbitrary subsets X ∩ Y.
Now, for the two steps in a slightly modified notation, corresponding to the diagram
X → Y → Z :
(Here and in what follows, we will be very cautious, and relativize all normalities. We
could perhaps obtain our objective with a more daring approach, using absolute normality
here and there. But this would be a purely technical trick (interesting in its own right), and
we look here more for a conceptual analysis, and, as long as we do not find good conceptual
reasons why to be absolute here and not there, we will just be relative everywhere.)
(1) If Y ∩ Z is a Z−BIG subset of Y (by Y → Z), and X ∩ Y is a Y−big subset of X
(by X → Y ), then X ∩ Y ∩ Z is a Z−big subset of X ∩ Y.
(2) If X ∩ Y ∩ Z is a Z−big subset of X ∩ Y, and X ∩ Y is a Y−big subset of X (by
X → Y ) again, then X ∩ Z is a Z−big subset of X, so X . . .→ Z.
Note that (1) is very different from Cumulativity or even Rational Monotony, as we do
not say anything about X in comparison to Y : X need not be any big or medium size
subset of Y.
Seen as strict rules, this will not work, as it is transitivity, and thus monotony: we have
to admit exceptions, as there might just be a negative arrow X 6→ Z in the diagram. We
will discuss such situations below in (C), where we will modify our approach slightly, and
obtain a clean analysis.
We try now to give justifications for the two (defeasible) rules. They will be philosophical
and can certainly be contested and/or improved.
For (1):
We look at Y. By X → Y, Y’s information is accessible at X, so, as Z−BIG is defined for
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Y, Z−big will be defined for Y ∩ X. Moreover, there is a priori nothing which prevents
X from being independent from Y, i.e. Y ∩ X to behave like Y with respect to Z - by
default: of course, there could be a negative arrow X 6→ Z, which would prevent this.
Thus, as Y ∩ Z is a Z−BIG subset of Y, Y ∩X ∩Z should be a Z−big subset of Y ∩X.
By the same argument (independence), we should also conclude that (Y − X) ∩ Z is a
Z−big subset of Y-X. The definition of Z−big for Y-X seems, however, less clear.
To summarize, Y ∩ X and Y-X behave by default with respect to Z as Y does, i.e.
Y ∩X ∩ Z is a Z−big subset of Y ∩X and (Y −X) ∩ Z is a Z−big subset of Y-X. The
reasoning is downward, from supersets to subsets, and symmetrical to Y ∩X and Y-X. If
the default is violated, we need a reason for it.
This default is an assumption about the adequacy of the language. Things do not change
wildly from one concept to another (or, better: from Y to Y ∧ X), they might change,
but then we are told so - by a corresponding negative link in the case of diagrams.
For (2):
By X → Y, X and Y are related, and we assume that X behaves as Y ∩ X does with
respect to Z. This is upward reasoning, from subset to superset and it is NOT symmetrical:
There is no reason to suppose that X-Y behaves the same way as X or Y ∩ X do with
respect to Z, as the only reason for Z we have, Y, does not apply.
Note that, putting relativity aside (which can also be considered as being big/small in
various, per default independent dimensions) this is close to the reasoning with absolutely
big/small sets: X ∩ Y − (X ∩ Y ∩ Z) is small in X ∩ Y, so a fortiori small in X, and
X − (X ∩ Y ) is small in X, so (X − (X ∩ Y )) ∪ (X ∩ Y − (X ∩ Y ∩ Z)) is small in X by
the filter property, so X ∩ Y ∩ Z is big in X, so a fortiori X ∩ Z is big in X.
Thus, in summary, we conclude by default that,
(3) If Y ∩ Z is a Z−BIG subset of Y, and X ∩ Y is a Y−big subset of X, then X ∩ Z is
a Z−big subset of X.
(B) The case with longer valid paths, but without conflicts.
Treatment of longer paths: Suppose we have a valid composed path from X to Y, X . . .→
Y, and not any longer a direct link X → Y. By induction (upward chaining!) we argue
- use directly (3) - that X ∩ Y is a Y−big subset of X, and conclude by (3) again that
X ∩ Z is a Z−big subset of X.
(C) Treatment of multiple and perhaps conflicting information.
Consider the following Diagram 5.1:
We want to analyze the situation and argue that e.g. X is mostly not in Z, etc.
First, all arguments about X and Z go via the Y ′s. The arrows from X to the Y ′s, and
from Y ′ to Y could also be valid paths. We look at information which concerns Z (thus
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U is not considered), and which is accessible (thus Y ′′ is not considered). (We can be
slightly more general, and consider all possible combinations of accessible information, not
only those used in the diagram by X.) Instead of arguing on the level of X, we will argue
one level above, on the Y’s and their intersections, respecting specificity and unresolved
conflicts.
(Note that in more general situations, with arbitrary information appended, the problem
is more complicated, as we have to check which information is relevant for some φ -
conclusions can be arrived at by complicated means, just as in ordinary logic. In such
cases, it might be better first to look at all accessible information for a fixed X, then at
the truth values and their relation, and calculate closure of the remaining information.)
We then have (using the obvious language: ”most A′s are B′s” for ′′A∩B is a big subset
of A′′, and ”MOST A′s are B′s” for ′′A ∩ B is a BIG subset of A′′) :
In Y, Y ′′, and Y ∩Y ′′, we have that MOST cases are in Z. In Y ′ and Y ∩Y ′, we have that
MOST cases are not in Z (= are in CZ). In Y ′∩Y ′′ and Y ∩Y ′∩Y ′′, we are UNDECIDED
about Z.
Thus:
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Y ∩ Z will be a Z−BIG subset of Y, Y ′′ ∩ Z will be a Z−BIG subset of Y ′′, Y ∩ Y ′′ ∩ Z
will be a Z−BIG subset of Y ∩ Y ′′.
Y ′ ∩CZ will be a Z−BIG subset of Y ′, Y ∩ Y ′ ∩CZ will be a Z−BIG subset of Y ∩ Y ′.
Y ′∩Y ′′∩Z will be a Z−MEDIUM subset of Y ′∩Y ′′, Y ∩Y ′∩Y ′′∩Z will be a Z−MEDIUM
subset of Y ∩ Y ′ ∩ Y ′′.
This is just simple arithmetic of truth values, using specificity and unresolved conflicts,
and the non-monotonicity is pushed into the fact that subsets need not preserve the
properties of supersets.
In more complicated situations, we implement e.g. the general principle (P2.2) from
Definition 2.1, to calculate the truth values. This will use in our case specificity for
conflict resolution, but it is an abstract procedure, based on an arbitrary relation < .
This will result in the ”correct” truth value for the intersections, i.e. the one corresponding
to the other approaches.
It remains to do two things: (C.1) We have to assure thatX ”sees” the correct information,
i.e. the correct intersection, and, (C.2), that X ”sees” the accepted Y ′s, i.e. those through
which valid paths go, in order to construct not only the result, but also the correct paths.
(Note that by split validity preclusion, if there is valid path from A through B to C,
σ : A · · · → B, B → C, and σ′ : A · · · → B is another valid path from A to B, then
σ′ ◦ B → C will also be a valid path. Proof: If not, then σ′ ◦ B → C is precluded,
but the same preclusion will also preclude σ ◦ B → C by split validity preclusion, or
it is contradicted, and a similar argument applies again. This is the argument for the
simplified definition of preclusion - see Remark 2.1, (4).)
(C.1) Finding and inheriting the correct information:
X has access to Z−information from Y and Y ′, so we have to consider them. Most of X
is in Y, most of X is in Y ′, i.e. X ∩ Y is a Y−big subset of X, X ∩ Y ′ is a Y ′−big subset
of X, so X ∩ Y ∩ Y ′ is a Y ∩ Y ′−big subset of X, thus most of X is in Y ∩ Y ′.
We thus have Y, Y ′, and Y ∩Y ′ as possible reference classes, and use specificity to choose
Y ∩Y ′ as reference class. We do not know anything e.g. about Y ∩Y ′∩Y ′′, so this is not
a possible reference class.
Thus, we use specificity twice, on the Y ′s−level (to decide that Y ∩ Y ′ is mostly not in
Z), and on X ′s−level (the choice of the reference class), but this is good policy, as, after
all, much of nonmonotonicity is about specificity.
We should emphasize that nonmonotonicity lies in the behaviour of the subsets (deter-
mined by truth values and comparisons thereof) and the choice of the reference class by
specificity. But both are straightforward now and local procedures, using information
already decided before. There is no complicated issue here like determining extensions
etc.
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We now use above argument, described in the simple case, but with more detail, speaking
in particular about the most specific reference class for information about Z, Y ∩Y ′ in our
example - this is used essentially in (1.4), where the ”real” information transfer happens,
and here we also go from BIG to big.
(1.1) By X → Y and X → Y ′ (and there are no other Z−relevant information sources),
we have to consider Y ∩ Y ′ as reference class.
(1.2)X∩Y is a Y−big subset ofX (by X → Y ) (it is even Y-BIG, but we are immediately
more general to treat valid paths), X ∩ Y ′ is a Y ′−big subset of X (by X → Y ′). So
X ∩ Y ∩ Y ′ is a Y ∩ Y ′−big subset of X.
(1.3) Y ∩Z is a Z−BIG subset of Y (by Y → Z), Y ′ ∩CZ is a Z−BIG subset of Y ′ (by
Y ′ 6→ Z), so by preclusion Y ∩ Y ′ ∩CZ is a Z−BIG subset of Y ∩ Y ′.
(1.4) Y ∩ Y ′ ∩CZ is a Z−BIG subset of Y ∩ Y ′, and X ∩ Y ∩ Y ′ is a Y ∩ Y ′−big subset
of X, so X ∩ Y ∩ Y ′ ∩CZ is a Z−big subset of X ∩ Y ∩ Y ′.
This cannot be a strict rule without the reference class, as it would then apply to Y ∩ Z,
too, leading to a contradiction.
(2) If X ∩ Y ∩ Y ′ ∩CZ is a Z−big subset of X ∩ Y ∩Y ′, and X ∩ Y ∩Y ′ is a Y ∩Y ′−big
subset of X, so X ∩CZ is a Z−big subset of X.
We make this now more formal.
We define for all nodes X, Y two sets: B(X, Y ), and b(X, Y ), where B(X, Y ) is the set
of Y−BIG subsets of X, and b(X, Y ) is the set of Y−big subsets of X. (To distinguish
undefined from medium/MEDIUM-size, we will also have to defineM(X, Y ) andm(X, Y ),
but we omit this here for simplicity.)
The translations are then:
(1.2′) X ∩ Y ∈ b(X, Y ) and X ∩ Y ′ ∈ b(X, Y ′) ⇒ X ∩ Y ∩ Y ′ ∈ b(X, Y ∩ Y ′)
(1.3′) Y ∩ Z ∈ B(Y, Z) and Y ′ ∩ CZ ∈ B(Y ′, Z) ⇒ Y ∩ Y ′ ∩ CZ ∈ B(Y ∩ Y ′, Z) by
preclusion
(1.4′) Y ∩Y ′ ∩CZ ∈ B(Y ∩Y ′, Z) and X ∩Y ∩Y ′ ∈ b(X, Y ∩Y ′) ⇒ X ∩Y ∩Y ′ ∩CZ ∈
b(X ∩ Y ∩ Y ′, Z) as Y ∩ Y ′ is the most specific reference class
(2′)X∩Y ∩Y ′∩CZ ∈ b(X∩Y ∩Y ′, Z) andX∩Y ∩Y ′ ∈ b(X, Y ∩Y ′)⇒X∩CZ ∈ b(X,Z).
Finally:
(3′) A ∈ B(X, Y ) → A ∈ b(X, Y ) etc.
Note that we used, in addition to the set rules, preclusion, and the correct choice of the
reference class.
(C.2) Finding the correct paths:
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Idea:
(1) If we come to no conclusion, then no path is valid, this is trivial.
(2) If we have a conclusion:
(2.1) All contradictory paths are out: e.g. Y ∩ Z will be Z-big, but Y ∩ Y ′ ∩CZ will be
Z-big. So there is no valid path via Y.
(2.2) Thus, not all paths supporting the same conclusion are valid.
Consider the following Diagram 5.2:
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There might be a positive path through Y, a negative one through Y ′, a positive one
through Y ′′ again, with Y ′′ → Y ′ → Y, so Y will be out, and only Y ′′ in. We can see this,
as there is a subset, {Y, Y ′} which shows a change: Y ′ ∩ Z is Z-BIG, Y ′ ∩CZ is Z-BIG,
Y ′′ ∩Z is Z-BIG, and Y ∩ Y ′ ∩CZ is Z-BIG, and the latter can only happen if there is a
preclusion between Y ′ and Y, where Y looses. Thus, we can see this situation by looking
only at the sets.
We show now equivalence with the inheritance formalism given in Section 3.
Fact 5.2
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(+++*** Orig. No.: Fact 5.2 )
The above definition and the one outlined in Definition 2.3 correspond.
Proof:
By induction on the length of the deduction that X ∩ Z (or X ∩CZ) is a Z−big subset
of X. (Outline)
It is a corollary of the proof that we have to consider only subpaths and information of
all generalized paths between X and Z.
Make all sets (i.e. one for every node) sufficiently different, i.e. all sets and boolean
combinations of sets differ by infinitely many elements, e.g. A∩B ∩C will have infinitely
many less elements than A∩B, etc. (Infinite is far too many, we just choose it by laziness
to have room for the B(X, Y ) and the b(X, Y ).
Put in X ∩ Y ∈ B(X, Y ) for all X → Y, and X ∩CY ∈ B(X, Y ) for all X 6→ Y as base
theory.
Length = 1 : Then big must be BIG, and, if X∩Z is a Z−BIG subset of X, then X → Z,
likewise for X ∩CZ.
We stay close now to above Diagram 5.1, so we argue for the negative case.
Suppose that we have deduced X ∩ CZ ∈ b(X,Z), we show that there must be a valid
negative path from X to Z. (The other direction is easy.)
Suppose for simplicity that there is no negative link from X to Z - otherwise we are
finished.
As we can distinguish intersections from elementary sets (by the starting hypothesis about
sizes), this can only be deduced using (2′). So there must be some suitable {Yi : i ∈ I}
and we must have deduced X ∩
⋂
Yi ∈ b(X,
⋂
Yi), the second hypothesis of (2
′). If I is a
singleton, then we have the induction hypothesis, so there is a valid path from X to Y.
So suppose I is not a singleton. Then the deduction of X ∩
⋂
Yi ∈ b(X,
⋂
Yi) can only
be done by (1.2′), as this is the only rule having in the conclusion an elementary set on
the left in b(., .), and a true intersection on the right. Going back along (1.2′), we find
X ∩ Yi ∈ b(X, Yi), and by the induction hypothesis, there are valid paths from X to the
Yi.
The first hypothesis of (2′), X ∩
⋂
Yi ∩CZ ∈ b(X ∩
⋂
Yi, Z) can be obtained by (1.3
′) or
(1.4′). If it was obtained by (1.3′), then X is one of the Yi, but then there is a direct link
from X to Z (due to the ”B”, BIG). As a direct link always wins by specificity, the link
must be negative, and we have a valid negative path from X to Z. If it was obtained by
(1.4′), then its first hypothesis
⋂
Yi ∩ CZ ∈ B(
⋂
Yi, Z) must have been deduced, which
can only be by (1.3′), but the set of Yi there was chosen to take all Yi into account for
which there is a valid path from X to Yi and arrows from the Yi to Z (the rule was only
43
present for the most specific reference class with respect to X and Z!), and we are done
by the definition of valid paths in Section 2.
✷
We summarize our ingredients.
Inheritance was done essentially by (1) and (2) of Section 5.1 (A) and its elaborations
(1.i), (2) and (1.i′), (2′). It consisted of a mixture of bold and careful (in comparison to
systems P and R) manipulation of big subsets. We had to be bolder than the systems P
and R are, as we have to transfer information also to perhaps small subsets. We had to be
more careful, as P and R would have introduced far more connections than are present.
We also saw that we are forced to loose the paradise of absolute small/big subsets, and
have to work with relative size.
We then have a plug-in decision what to do with contradictions. This is a plug-in, as it is
one (among many possible) solutions to the much more general question of how to deal
with contradictory information, in the presence of a (partial, not necessarily transitive)
relation which compares strength. At the same place of our procedure, we can plug in
other solutions, so our approach is truly modular in this aspect. The comparing relation
is defined by the existence of valid paths, i.e. by specificity.
This decision is inherited downward using again the specificity criterion.
Perhaps the deepest part of the analysis can be described as follows: Relevance is coded
by positive arrows, and valid positive paths, and thus is similar to Kripke structures
for modality. But, relevance (in this reading, which is closely related to causation) is
profoundly non-monotonic, and any purely monotonic treatment of relevance would be
insufficient. This seems to correspond to intuition. Relevance is then expressed formally
by the possibility of combining different small/big sets. This is, of course, a special form
of relevance, there might be other forms.
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